

ABRAHAM LINCOLN AS A GENERAL.

and towered head and shoulders  
in all.

ry first days of the war the question  
 as to what should be done with the  
 led into existence by proclamation:  
 would they march and when should  
 Of course the march to the capital  
 would be the first, and the march  
 through Baltimore, and the line of the  
 march should be protected, but as soon as  
 the route was secured something more  
 was needed. McClellan, who was then living  
 at home, had been made commander of  
 the army, and put in command of the  
 army to invade and repossess West  
 Virginia. He was in the midst of his labors of  
 reorganization, and he wrote to Gen. Scott proposing  
 a campaign—"a march to the sea," from  
 Great Kanawha on Richmond, and  
 the event of Kentucky assuming a  
 position, to cross the Ohio at Cincinnati  
 with 80,000 men, march straight  
 on, and thence east according to cir-  
 cumstances. These plans were submitted  
 to the President with the reasons supporting

their "astounding crudeness" was  
Gen. Scott's endorsement thereon.  
In general, however, was not content  
but soon followed it by an elaborate  
his own. Bolingbroke upon "a com-  
dation of the Atlanta Fair and the  
a "powerful movement down the  
t with a cordon of posts to the  
the object being to clear out and  
this great line of communication in  
with the strict blockade of the sea-  
to envelop the insurgent States  
them to terms with less bloodshed  
other side," the movement was  
into the Richmond campaign, but  
many changes before it became  
The latter be a new known, some-  
atively, as "Scott's Anacostia," and  
as many vicissitudes, was ulti-  
mately out by Grant, and be-

that will blow the Confederacy apart. It is not enough," he said, "to have two fundamental ideas—the one Chief was never afterward lost to Lincoln, and that "In substance prophetic and decisive." National capital having been saved by its location and organization of a force in its defense, the "sacred soil of Virginia" was on the 27th of May, 1861, declared free by Congress. The President's authority was thus established as extremely vindicated his action by the fact that "the people of Virginia, having resisted rebellion to make it no longer a border, the Government had no choice but to deal with it where it found it." Fighting forces grew rapidly into Army, and afterward into the Army of Northern Virginia.

Another great assembly took place at the Ferry under Patterson and now nation's strength had begun to show

take form, the newspapers made up their minds to support the party. But forth "the nation's war cry" to Richmond!" No time could be lost for organizing and drilling, advice pouring in from the north, toward movement was imperatively demanded by the people, and although the South opposed it, the President and Warrented him, and an immediate movement was ordered. The rebels had taken Manassas and Harper's Ferry, and they were outnumbered by the Union army. They succeeded in concentrating their forces in time to repulse the Union well-organized and to drive him back to the Potomac. The Union army was defeated in the campaign, but stood su- perior while his opponent hastened away to the north. The Union army was the national army of victory against the national

was fought in obedience to political aims, and it has been unparalelled in purely military operations. But, as our critics justly observe: "War and politics are inseparable and interdependent; and to plan a campaign without the direct interference of an Administration is as foolish as to plan a campaign without the aid of money." Anybody who saw of historical criticism, they summed up the whole case as follows: Lincoln, on June 29, assembled his War Cabinet, the commanders, as military strategists, and they decided that the existing situation, if not properly handled, could win a victory for the Confederacy and a victory at Winchester at the cost of Gen. Scott's army. The only way to win a decisive victory, if it was to be won, was to win a military point of view it was wiser to defer any offensive campaign.

the following autumn. Here the Cabinet as political experts and on their part decided correct- public theme would not admit of. Thus the Administration itself was fairly aided the President was for the forward movement. Both combined strategy of the two armies for the conduct of the Bull Run campaign for the escape of Johnston, the panic; for the opposing forces raw, equally undisciplined, and fought the battle with equal courage."

Meanwhile, in this first shadow of  
sident Lincoln maintained his  
dispoise of manner and speech. A  
absolute patience was his most con-  
to follow with watchfulness the  
accumulation of a new army was  
for occupation. Already  
he began the display of that rare  
administration which enabled him to  
mountains of obstacles and bridge  
difficulty in his control of men,  
one onward to the end of the war  
as daily and hourly amid the vast  
of command, and coordination in  
armies, army and navy, and the  
national politics, and the ques-  
tions, to allay the jealousies  
to compose the rivalries of Gen-  
the vanity of officials, to  
laggard, to curb the ardent, to

altering was a substratum of all, underlying the great events of battles, and high questions of strategy. After the battle of Bull Run a sketch of "the policy and programme," which he regarded as the new condition of affairs. It proved that it involved the following:

1. A complete blockade of the entire seacoasting States.

2. The concentration of Butler's forces at Fort Monroe, constant drill, discipline, and instruction.

3. The capture of Baltimore "with a gentle and certain hand."

4. The strengthening of the force under Patterson.

5. The continuation of operations in West Virginia under the instructions of McClellan.

6. The organization and pushing forward of the operations in the West.

organization of the Bull Run forces three months' men as rapidly as possible. "The first thing I want to emphasize of such of the three months' is not re-arranging the deck chairs while the ship is sinking," he said. "I want to see the Bull Run forces organized and prepared for the worst." The speaker had been at the meeting since 10:30 a. m. and indicated that Kansas' "unhappy situation should be solved as quickly as possible, with an open line from Washington, and an open line from Kansas, so that the military men would be doing these things."

He proposed, "a joint movement on Memphis and from Cincinnati," Tennessee.

He said he had already recommended that Congress "should give him the money to make this control and that you place the control of the work at least 400,000 men and 400,000 dollars in the hands of Bull Run, Congress must have